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Abstract
Every person has wondered whether idealism without naı̈veté or realism without
cynicism is possible. In common parlance, utopia is not only eu-topic (a place of the
good), but also forever a-topic (without place). Who is right: the idealist who believes,
or the realist who disbelieves, in the possibility of a perfect society? This article suggests
that utopia both is and is not possible. There are two ways to understand the idea of a
‘‘perfect society.’’ In an absolutely perfect society there is no reality of sin. Given this
reality, however, in some societies it nonetheless is easier to be good. Thus, a certain
level of perfection is possible: the best possible level. The often ignored principle of the
two levels of perfection may diffuse tensions, close off powerful temptations towards
naı̈veté and cynicism, and give birth to new openings in political and theological
discussion.
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‘‘Realism is the ability to maintain the noblest aspirations of the soul even as one
remains beset by personal weaknesses.’’
—Alexandre Havard, Virtuous Leadership (New York: Scepter, 2007), 135
‘‘[The lawgiver] had not given [his countrymen] absolutely the best [laws], but the best
which they were capable of receiving.’’
—Origen, Contra Celsum, iii

Introduction: Utopia?
In 1516 Thomas More wrote what would become his most famous work: Utopia.
Raphael Hytholdaeus shares an incredible story: he claims to have visited an
exceptionally wonderful island called Utopia, its citizens lacking vices, and
its form of government lacking the weaknesses that beset all other known societies.
As we know, the word utopia derives from this classic book. The word utopia has
found its way, often unaltered, into most common languages. In common
language, utopia stands for ‘‘a perfect society’’ or ‘‘a perfect state.’’
But despite the assumed perfection, both academic political thought and
common parlance attach a qualiﬁed, pejorative meaning to the word. Utopia is
not only eu-topic (a place of the good), but also forever a-topic (without place).
Most utopias envisioned and attempted by political theorists turn out to be, often
sooner than later, quite horrid places, as history has shown. Indeed, the names of
such utopias—say, ‘‘The Third Reich,’’ ‘‘eugenics,’’ and so on—have become
bywords for evil, and not even Plato’s ‘‘Republic,’’ ‘‘The Kingdom of Heaven’’,
or ‘‘City Upon a Hill’’ are free of negative connotations.1 Hence, intellectuals think
the only characteristic separating utopia from dystopia is the preﬁx. Commoners,
also, know that utopias ‘‘simply don’t work.’’ Thus, what utopia really means is ‘‘a
place that does not exist nor ever can—or if it did, it would be a horrible place.’’
If you believe otherwise, the so-called Realist will label you a naı̈ve Idealist: ‘‘How
utopian!’’ The so-called Idealist, in turn, will reply to this charge by reminding the
Realist of cynicism’s self-fulﬁlling nature.
Indeed, all thoughtful people, and most politicians, have contemplated these two
timeless questions: (1) Is it possible to remain an Idealist without being naı̈ve? And
conversely: (2) Is it possible to remain a Realist without regressing into cynicism?
These universal questions resurface constantly, restated in various forms. Is it
possible to proceed in hopeful civic activism without it degenerating into false
optimism? Is it possible to squarely acknowledge evil-infested reality without it
lapsing into acceptance of this reality, in other words, without embracing fatalist
pessimism?
I am sure most would agree that the answer to these two interrelated questions
is, ‘‘Yes, it is possible.’’ Idealism without otherworldliness is diﬃcult but possible;
and realism without cynicism is likewise diﬃcult but possible. Some of us know this
to be so for having experienced it ourselves. Some have witnessed it in others. There
are various relevant factors, including potent Christian virtues and doctrines, which
can contribute to the compatibility of idealism and realism, free from naı̈veté and
cynicism.2 In this article, I propose only one.
1. For a recent discussion of the dangers of programmatic utopias, see Roger Scruton’s aptly titled
The Uses of Pessimism: And the Danger of False Hope (New York: Oxford, 2010).
2. See Charles Mathewes, A Theology of Public Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
For an account of the interplay between the virtue of love and public life, see Eric Gregory, Politics
and the Order of Love (Chicago: Chicago, 2008). As for the doctrine of sin in its classic form,
Reinhold Niebuhr has written that it ‘‘offends both rationalists and moralists by maintaining the

It is a less obvious and less discussed factor, a simple logical conclusion found
upon an analysis of the idea of a perfect society. Who is right: the Realist who
disbelieves, or the Idealist who believes, in the possibility of a perfect society? I will
suggest that they are both right. Perfect society both is and is not possible.
From here on, I use ‘‘utopia’’ and ‘‘perfect society’’ synonymously. As this
article is an exercise in logic, not a historical analysis, by ‘‘utopia’’ I mean, not
particular historical experiments, but simply the more abstract ‘‘a society where all
is well.’’ This exercise in logic is not, however, simply an intellectual balancing act.
As a theologian, educator, and leadership trainer, I have witnessed its eﬃcacy in
response to quandaries citizens face.

Levels of perfection: Absolute versus possible
Utopia is an illusion
It seems that there are two ways to understand the idea of ‘‘perfect society,’’ a society
where all is well. The ﬁrst is an absolutely perfect society. A society not beset by vice,
by crime, by suﬀering, by exploitation, and so on. In theological terms, a society not
invaded by the reality of sin and its corrosive consequences. The Realist is right. Such
a society does not and cannot exist. Not that the goal of policy-making and law is not
the eradication of vice and injustices—it is—but by itself it cannot fulﬁl the task. This
is not only a practical truth, but a fundamental one, for virtue cannot be ‘‘forced’’
from the outside. If a politician believes otherwise, if they believe that the solutions to
all societal problems are simply technical ones at the law-makers’ ready disposal, the
Realist’s charge ‘‘How utopian!’’ is quite justiﬁed.

Utopia is not an illusion
But the idea of a ‘‘perfect society’’ can be understood in another way. True, all
structures eventually crumble; all ﬁxes fail or eventually lose their eﬀective power.
Architectural styles vary, but the builders and the building material is always the
same: human beings. It merits us not to blame the wall, if the bricks, by nature, are
variously bent and cracked. However, as Charles Mathewes notes, misery is ‘‘not
[only] a matter of individuals’ wanton rapaciousness; there are material and
structural forces shaping our behaviour.’’3 In some societies it is easier to ‘‘be
good’’ than in others (or more diﬃcult to ‘‘be bad’’). Certain structures support
( fnote continued)
seemingly absurd position that man sins inevitably and by a fateful necessity but that he is nevertheless to be held responsible for actions which are prompted by an ineluctable fate’’ (The Nature
and Destiny of Man [1941], I, 241), quoted in Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1975), I, 279. This ‘‘two-horned dilemma’’ of Christian anthropology,
the inevitability of sin and our responsibility for sin, has been resisting the corresponding extremes,
moralism and fatalism, throughout history.
3. Mathewes, Theology of Public Life, 75.

the cultivation of virtue better than others. Certain structures appear to be more
solid. In other words, it is possible, to a certain extent, to lessen the derogatory
inﬂuence of the bent bricks themselves. This is why societies opt for diﬀerent forms
of government, why there exist the police force, schools, law-courts, and so on.
In addition to these concrete institutions, at work within societies are various nongovernmental organizations, impersonal forces and trends, family cultures, and the
like, that may encourage constructive proactivity and in many ways support the
cultivation of virtue. Some societies do this better than others, of course. There is
also the element of contingency: it may be that a given structure or policy works
best in certain historical, social, or cultural settings, and worse in others.
Thus, the second way to deﬁne a ‘‘perfect society’’ is the best possible society.
A perfect society with qualiﬁcations. We cannot attain an absolutely perfect
society, but a certain level or approximation of this ideal is attainable: the best
possible level.
This realization may seem too simple to be taken seriously. But the Idealist is
right, too. Such a society is possible, because we are speaking, by deﬁnition, of the
best possible society. This level acknowledges the limits of our human nature,
which aﬀects both our everyday behaviour and our ability to envision, implement,
and sustain good policies. The irony is that perfect society—utopia—in this sense is
not necessarily forever a-topic (without place), but a real possibility.
This conclusion, although a truth in itself, does not, of course, work out the
means to the end. It does not supply the details of, for example, which policies
work best in a given country in a given time. Only prudence does. But it can
provide motivation to work out the means. Fiddling with pieces of a puzzle may
be fun for a time, but if your goal is actually to match the right pieces to create
an elaborate whole, it helps to know that this whole is both theoretically and
practically attainable, even if you are not quite sure what the ﬁnished work will
look like.
This said, the ‘‘puzzle pieces’’ of society are always the same. They include
policy-making, education, the role and relationship of various institutions, like
Church and state, and so on. Lest our understanding of ‘‘perfect society’’ remains
vacuous to the extent of disappearance into mere abstraction, we need to root
our discussion in some of these more concrete elements that together make up
a society.

Shades of perfection: The challenges of policy making
The puzzles of policy making are fundamentally challenging. Every parent knows
the diﬃculty of child raising. Many things need to be taken into consideration in the
education of our children. It can fail for a great number of reasons. We may, for
instance, educate for the wrong reasons, make uninformed or destructive choices,
err in a seemingly endless number of ways. Despite our best intentions the consequences of our choices are often unpredictable. What is more, children are
separate individuals with their own free wills, and can choose to behave or react

in whimsical ways. Our ‘‘lack of control’’ over the matter is not only practical, but
also fundamental, for, as noted above, it belongs to the authentic nature of virtue
that it cannot be forced.
If policy-making on this ‘‘simple’’ family level is so complex, we can imagine the
insurmountable challenges policy makers on the municipal, national, or international levels face daily. Take, for instance, the problem of alcoholism or drug
abuse. Most people would agree that there is something disturbing about these
phenomena. But that is where simple agreement ends. There are many diﬀerent
ways to deal with or tackle these social problems, some of which are mutually
exclusive.
It is important to note that disagreement or lack of unanimity in these matters
does not rule out the possibility of shades of perfection. Shades of perfection in
turn presuppose perfection, so disagreement in fact supports the thesis of the two
levels of perfection. Disagreement does not disprove the existence or attainability
of ideal policy, rather it presupposes it. Between extremes there is much room for
constructive discussion and legitimate variety. In one way, the clear cut continuum
from a ‘‘less’’ to a ‘‘more’’ perfect society is misleading, for all imperfections are
deviations of perfection, not only simplistic defects or excesses.
One central question of policy making concerns policy-making itself: what form
of government is optimal in a given historical setting, and how much power should
this government wield? Is the government really responsible for the moral perfection of its citizens and to what extent? We may argue that family and non-governmental vitality must be protected, even at the expense of government vitality. There
are no easy answers. But, again, we can see that this challenge or objection does not
nullify the principle of the best possible level. For in any case, in a perfect society
the government wields an optimal amount of power, as much power as is needed
for the longevity of the best possible society.

Planes of perfection: Religion and public life
Challenges more relevant to political theology are (1) the structural relationship
between Church and state and (2) the theological relationship between faith and
public life. As regards the ﬁrst, Church and state, many models have been suggested. Some models are obviously bad. There is the extreme of militant, totalitarian atheism: a state of aﬀairs where the state actively combats religion, or a state
that actively promotes moral vice. Another extreme, paternalistic theocracy, sends
(I hope) similar shivers down our spines. Forced virtue and forced religion pervert
the good they seek to promote, because, yet again, fundamental to the nature of
virtue and religion is freedom.
The relationship between faith and public life may be even more multifaceted.
At this point it might be worthwhile to return to the idea of perfection. For we may
ask, by perfection do we mean the ‘‘natural’’ common good, the fullness of virtue in
citizens, or is it the ‘‘supernatural’’ common good, the forgiveness of sins, the
sanctiﬁcation of citizens? Or, to put it in crude but instructive terms, in a perfect

society, do we have perfect social-work or perfect evangelism?4 The distinction
between the so-called natural and supernatural planes may be a necessary one.
But two things must be said.
First, as we know, distinction does not mean separation. The two orders or
planes of perfection (to separate them from the two ‘‘levels’’ of perfection) are
intricately joined. There may be intimate links, both one-way and two-way, bridging the two planes. The one may aﬀect the other. I spoke earlier of the virtue of
prudence. Etymologically, prudentia comes from providentia, and according to
philosopher Peter Geach, although ‘‘etymologies are often misleading, this one is
not.’’5 Mathewes agrees: ‘‘True prudence is a deeply theologically informed
approach to valuing and inhabiting our existence. . . To be worldly, we ﬁnd we
must raise issues that are properly theological, while our theological interests are
always cashed out in worldly ways.’’6 The second point to note is that, regardless of
which plane we choose as the proper paradigm for an ideal society, the principle of
the best possible level still applies. There is an optimal state of aﬀairs for purely
‘‘natural’’ perfection, and there is likewise an optimal state of aﬀairs for ‘‘graced’’
perfection. These states of aﬀairs may, or may not, coincide.

Conclusion: A tautology
The best possible society is possible, and it is the best possible society. This, the
single argument of this article, is both humble and lofty. Humble because it is a
tautology; and, like all tautologies, amounts to the astonishing 2 + 2 ¼ 4. Lofty
because, like in mathematics, ‘‘the highest does not stand without the lowest.’’7 The
higher mathematical truths are as tautologous as the elementary ones; the tautologous element of the elementary truths is just easier to detect. Or, it may be that
in some cases elementary truths are more diﬃcult to detect. There is always
a ﬁrst time for everything. The ﬁrst time you realize that 2 + 2 ¼ 4 may be a
groundbreaking experience.
Indeed, I anticipate two possible responses. I said earlier that this principle may
be too simplistic to be taken seriously. For some, the best possible society is possible is a mere tautology hardly worth pronouncing. True, it is a tautology.

4. ‘‘Christians have survived,’’ writes Charles Mathewes, ‘‘many different political structures in the
world. Good Christians live as subjects of the tyrannical autocracies of East and Central Asia, in
the oligarchic kleptocracies of the Middle East, in the semi-democracies of Latin America, even in
the complete ‘stateless’ conditions across much of Africa’’ (Theology of Public Life, 23). True, many
have suffered from poor political structures, but they would certainly rather suffer from good ones.
Mathewes’s point is, however, elsewhere: his goal is ‘‘not to use faith to support democratic culture,
but the reverse, and more—to use our civic interactions with one another to deepen faith’’ (23,
emphasis added).
5. Peter Geach, The Virtues (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 70.
6. Mathewes, Theology of Public Life, 79–80.
7. Thomas à Kempis, The Imitation of Christ, 2:10.

‘‘But tautologies,’’ reminds C. S. Lewis, ‘‘are not always barren tautologies.’’8
Thus, for a second group of people, caught up in the interminable realism versus
idealism—pessimism versus optimism—debate, the principle of the two levels of
perfection in society may diﬀuse tensions and give birth to some new openings. It
begins by closing oﬀ powerful temptations towards naı̈veté and cynicism.
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